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Regulation of CBRN Security in Italy

Legal Framework and Recent Developments

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No single “CBRN code” — a layered framework

Coverage is broad but distributed across many authorities — at once the model’s strength and its limit.

THREE LEGAL LAYERS

- 1 International conventions**
Non-proliferation treaties: CWC, BTWC, IAEA framework.
- 2 European Union law**
Directives & regulations transposed into national law.
- 3 National security & civil protection**
Domestic authorities, emergency planning, response.

FOUR SECTOR DOMAINS

-  **Nuclear & Radiological**
-  **Chemical**
-  **Biological**
-  **Dual-use goods**





The most structured domain

Independent regulator

- ISIN — National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety & Radiation Protection.
- National Warning Point; competent authority under international conventions for prompt notification & assistance.

Founding law

- Legislative Decree 101/2020, transposing Euratom Directive 2013/59.
- Reorganises the field around justification, optimisation and dose limitation.

Emergency response

- National Plan — Prime-Ministerial Decree of 14 March 2022.
- Three scenarios by distance of the plant; civil-protection coordination; iodine prophylaxis.

Context: Italy generates no nuclear power today (plants closed after the 1987 referendum), yet keeps a full safety regime for sources, research reactors, decommissioning, waste and transport — with a national debate and a brand new bill on a possible return to nuclear now under way.



■ DOMAIN 2 · CHEMICAL

A mature regime: international verification + national control



Convention & ratification

Chemical Weapons Convention, ratified by Law 496/1995, amended and completed by Law 93/1997.



National Authority

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the competent administrations, supports OPCW inspections and reports to Parliament every year.



Industry declarations

The Chemical Weapons Section at the Ministry of Enterprises manages the declaratory obligations of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry.





Institutionally the least developed domain

Convention

- Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention, ratified by Law 962/1979.
- No dedicated national authority and no equivalent verification mechanism — the Convention itself lacks one.

Where biosecurity sits

- Handled through the health system and the National Institute of Health (ISS).
- Increasingly anchored to the EU framework on serious cross-border health threats.

EU ANCHOR

Regulation (EU) 2022/2371

HERA — health emergency authority

ECDC — disease prevention & control





Where non-proliferation meets trade control

The rules

- Regulation (EU) 2021/821, completed by national implementing legislation.
- Covers goods, software and technology with both civil and military uses.

Competent authority

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UAMA) grants export authorisations.
- Information exchange and end-use checks across Member States.

THE FUNCTION

This is the instrument that turns the principle of non-proliferation into concrete control over commercial and technological flows — the items that could feed chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.



■ COMMON ARCHITECTURE

One response architecture — and the 2024 turn to resilience



Civil Protection Code (2018)

Treats CBRN as a civil-protection risk; operational coordination by the National Service. On the ground: Fire-and-Rescue NBCR teams and the Armed Forces' CBRN defence.



Counter-terrorism

A national plan for defence against CBRN terrorism sits alongside the civil-protection track. Italy also ratified in 2016 the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

RECENT — 2024 TRANSPOSITIONS

Critical Entities Resilience (CER) — D.Lgs. 134/2024

A multi-risk duty — including CBRN — on operators of essential services (energy, transport, health, water) to assess risks and adopt resilience plans.

NIS2 cybersecurity — D.Lgs. 138/2024

Inter-ministerial Resilience Committee at the Presidency of the Council; national strategy and critical-entity identification rolling out across 2025–2026.

CBRN security is being folded into the broader resilience of critical infrastructure.





Comprehensive in substance, fragmented in architecture

STRENGTHS

- ✓ An independent nuclear regulator (ISIN).
- ✓ A clear national authority for chemical-weapons obligations.
- ✓ Tested radiological/nuclear emergency planning.
- ✓ Growing integration into EU frameworks.

GAPS & RECOMMENDATIONS

- ⚠ Many actors, many sources, uneven maturity across domains.
- ⚠ Update the counter-terrorism CBRN plan.
- ⚠ Revise cross-border health-threat legislation.
- ⚠ Invest in specialist training and public risk communication.





Toward an integrated, all-hazards EU posture



Preparedness Union Strategy (March 2025)

Whole-of-society, all-hazards readiness, building on the Niinistö report; explicitly addresses CBRN and strengthens civil-military coordination.



Stockpiling + Medical Countermeasures (July 2025)

Include CBRN countermeasures; rescEU detection & decontamination teams; HERA; the new “Medifence” initiative for CBRN and armed-conflict threats.



CBRN Action Plan (2017, updated)

Prevention, detection, preparedness and response across the Union.





THREE TAKEAWAYS

1

An independent nuclear authority

Regulatory credibility starts with independence.

2

A clear national authority per treaty

One visible owner for each convention obligation.

3

Bring a dispersed field into a system

Coordination, not new silos, is the task ahead.

Grazie · Дякую · Thank you

